Greece 1943
The year 1943 was a turning point for the outcome of the second World War in Europe. During the first months the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa seemed certain as the German and the Italian troops had retreated to Tunisia. In the Eastern Front the German Army failed to capture Stalingrad and suffered massive losses. Germany itself was constantly attacked by air and the Allies were preparing for an invasion in Southern Europe. The Germans anticipated quite early that Italy would break the alliance with them and realized that this event could create serious problems in Greece, where the Italians were the main occupation force. A destabilization in Greece due to an exit of Italy from the war could lead to an Allied invasion and even encourage Turkey to break its neutrality and join the Allies. In addition, the establishment of a front in the Southern Balkans would pose a threat for the oil-producing facilities in Romania, which were vital for the German war effort.
In the region of the Aegean Sea the Dodecanese islands were Italian territory since 1924. In 1940 Italy invaded Greece from Albania but the Greek Army managed to resist effectively and very soon the Italian forces were pushed back into the Albanian territory. After a second invasion by the Germans in 1941 Greece passed in control of the Axis forces. To the Italians were handed the largest part of the Greek mainland, the Ionian islands, most of the smaller islands of the Aegean Sea and the eastern part of Crete. To the Bulgarians was handed the norhern region of Thrace. The Germans kept under their control the most strategically important areas: the city of Athens, the port of Pireaus, Central Macedonia, one prefecture of Thrace which bordered with neutral Turkey and the some islands of the Aegean (icluding western and central Crete, Melos, Lemnos, Lesvos and Chios).
For the Germans the line of defence in Greece was Peloponnese - Kythira - Crete - Dodecanese (mainly Rhodes and Karpathos), but they had serious doubts regarding the ability of the Italians to defend the Dodecanese islands. In early 1943, they sent two 88m anti-aircaft batteries to Rhodes, along with some Officers who had the task to evaluate the Italian defences. Their report was alarming and in March a German Infanry Brigade was sent to the island. In late May this force received reinforcements and became an Infanty Division (aprox. 7500 men).
The British and the Americans had different plans for Greece in 1943 and this greatly affected the outcome of the military operations that followed the Italian armistice with the Allies. In late 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had ordered the preparation of a small-scale military intervention in the Docecanese region, in order to capture the islands. On May 2, the British plan (code-named "Accolade") was ready. The main objectives were the occupation of Karpathos, Rhodes, Kos and Leros. The rest of the Aegean islands were secondary objectives. In case of success the captured islands would be offered to Turkey as an incentive to join the war in the side of the Allies. However, when the British plan was presented to the Americans on May 12th they refused to support it, insisting that all available forces should be used for the support of the Pacific front and for the Allied invasion of Italy. Churchill was determined to proceed and the British continued their preparations despite the American refusal. In early August , with the Allies having established their positions in Sicily after a successful invasion, the British asked from the Commander of the Allied forces in North Africa (U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower) to allow the use of a small number of ships and long-range fighter planes for an invasion of Karpathos and Rhodes with two infantry brigades. Eisenhower not only refused but assigned the infantry forces to the Italian front and the ships to the Pacific, leaving the British with a single infantry brigade (the 234th, the British garrison of Malta).
The collapse of the Italian forces in Sicily and the fall of Benito Mussolini led Hitler and his staff to prepare an emegency plan, code-named "Achse" (Axis) in order to disarm the Italian forces in every war front. In Greece, the German troops would have to rely on the German Navy for their movement around the islands as only a few of them had airports adequate for use by transport planes. In the Aegean, there were four small coast-guard fleets (flotillas): the 12th (from Attica), the 10th (from Thessaloniki), the 13th (from Crete) and the 11th (from Lemnos). The vessels composing these flotillas were very small boats equipped with anti-aircraft guns. The frequent attacks by Allied submarines led to the creation of the 21st anti-submarine Flotilla (January 1942), composed of vessels of various origins. A total of 16 small ferries suitable for the transport of troops and other equipment were also available. On September 1943, the German naval force in the Aegean was inadeguate for large-scale operations: 1 destroyer (TA-10), 2 mine-layers (the Drache and the Bulgaria), 11 vessels of the 21st anti-submarine Flotilla (with 5 of them being modified wooden boats) and 10-12 vessels of the 12th mine-laying Flotilla. Several old cargo ships were used for transport purposes.
The collapse of the Italian forces in Sicily and the fall of Benito Mussolini led Hitler and his staff to prepare an emegency plan, code-named "Achse" (Axis) in order to disarm the Italian forces in every war front. In Greece, the German troops would have to rely on the German Navy for their movement around the islands as only a few of them had airports adequate for use by transport planes. In the Aegean, there were four small coast-guard fleets (flotillas): the 12th (from Attica), the 10th (from Thessaloniki), the 13th (from Crete) and the 11th (from Lemnos). The vessels composing these flotillas were very small boats equipped with anti-aircraft guns. The frequent attacks by Allied submarines led to the creation of the 21st anti-submarine Flotilla (January 1942), composed of vessels of various origins. A total of 16 small ferries suitable for the transport of troops and other equipment were also available. On September 1943, the German naval force in the Aegean was inadeguate for large-scale operations: 1 destroyer (TA-10), 2 mine-layers (the Drache and the Bulgaria), 11 vessels of the 21st anti-submarine Flotilla (with 5 of them being modified wooden boats) and 10-12 vessels of the 12th mine-laying Flotilla. Several old cargo ships were used for transport purposes.
After the announcement of the Italian Armistice on September 8, 1943 the majority of the Italian troops were left with no instructions and they were soon overwhelmed by the German forces who immediately put "Achse" into effect. The regions where the Italians managed to put up serious resistance were Greece and Corsica. In Corsica the Italian garrison fought alongside the free French Forces and the German troops had to evacuate the island by the end of September, suffering significant losses. In Greece, the Supreme Commander of the Italian Army (General Carlo Vecchiarelli) was very surprised by the news of the Armistice. The Germans took advantage of the confusion and took control of the Greek mainland without great effort. However, the Germans knew well that the islands would be more diffucult cases and they were quick to capture six Italian warships (2 destroyers and 4 torpedo boats). These vessels (renamed TA 14, TA 15, TA 16, TA 17, TA 18 and TA 19) formed the 9th Flotilla of torpedo boats and they became a very important reinforcement of the small German naval force.
This website will cover the story of the Italian soldiers from the garrisons of the Dodecanese islands, the Ionian islands and Crete who lost their lives at sea after being captured by the Germans. Their Greek tragedy left deep scars in many Italian families and is largely forgotten today.
This website will cover the story of the Italian soldiers from the garrisons of the Dodecanese islands, the Ionian islands and Crete who lost their lives at sea after being captured by the Germans. Their Greek tragedy left deep scars in many Italian families and is largely forgotten today.
SOURCES
www.wikipedia.org [Info about the liberation of Corsica]
AGAIO 1943 - Manos Mastorakos [Doureios Ippos, Athens, 2004, ISBN 960883550]
POLEMOS STO AIGAIO: 1941 - 1945 - Peter Schenk [Eurobooks, September 2008, ISBN 978-960-98327-2-4]
www.wikipedia.org [Info about the liberation of Corsica]
AGAIO 1943 - Manos Mastorakos [Doureios Ippos, Athens, 2004, ISBN 960883550]
POLEMOS STO AIGAIO: 1941 - 1945 - Peter Schenk [Eurobooks, September 2008, ISBN 978-960-98327-2-4]